"Torturer's Dilemma" for Central and Eastern Europe

Šis darbas pratęsia naujų demokratijų santykio su buvusiu nedemokratiniu režimu tyrimą, atliktą autoriaus bakalauriniame darbe, taikydamas jį demokratiją atkūrusios Vidurio ir Rytų Europos situacijai. Pasinaudojant ankstesniame darbe pristatytu modeliu, kuris santykio su buvusiu režimu galimybes klasifikuoja per to režimo tipo ir jo baigties aplinkybių sąveiką, siekiama pagrįsti bendros komunistinės praeities slegiamų regiono valstybių demokratinės tranzicijos skirtumus. Atitinkamai paaiškinami naujų lyderių pasirinkti nevienodi keliai, sprendžiant komunistų partijos struktūrų ir atskirų veikėjų atsakomybės problemąThe article furthers the research on the relation of democratizing states with their former non-democratic regimes by focusing on the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe's re-established democracies The author utilizes his previously introduced research framework, based on the assessment (and interplay) of the type of the regime and the manner in which it ended. This serves to emphasize differences in the democratic transition of the region's states and, accordingly, the various paths chosen by new leaders in dealing with the problem of Communist party activist responsibility. The article also touches upon structural and psychological legacy of Communism. Along with glaring commonalities of the former Communist bloc, there were specific issues as well. In short, the findings reflect the following: 1 ) The transition of Hungary, in many aspects, replicates the "reforma pactada" formula. Partially, this holds true for Eoland, too, but its position was complicated by limits on democratic representation set via the pact, that ring more of those achieved by military hierarchy in the event of extrication. The two states may be viewed as hardly favorable to the purge of old apparatus, despite the Poles' formal lustration laws. 2) In the Czech Republic and former Fast Germany (GDR), the situation became favorable to the prosecution of regime's activists, as the stagnating post-totalitarianism simply collapsed in those countries leaving a power vacuum, without a possibility to mobilize in self-defense. However, the broad range purges, that ensued in these states, much too often came in contradiction with the principles of rule of law and universal human rights. 3) The Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) did not experience direct collapse of the system, even though they also had just gone through stagnation. In part, this was due, to the circumstance that any actions were still limited by the threat of force from "the Center" (almost a nonfactor to the satellites in the Central Europe by that time). Moreover, the local Communist leaders supported dissent and displayed mild opposition to Moscow earlier on, placing themselves as indispensable moderating force in the transitional period. The attempts to formulate legal stance towards Communist regime, as such, were sporadic and mostly instrumental in political struggle, with no observable results. 4 ) The old party structures did not have to undergo any serious transformation to lead the transition of early post-totalitarian states such as Bulgaria, or semi-sultanist Romania. These countries saw trials of only few leaders, "hand-picked" at the discretion of the party. Different out come could hardly have been anticipated, acknowledging early post-totalitarianism as too close to the original totalitarian system, unfavorable not only to the advancement of legal responsibility to regime's officers, but even democratization in genera